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Propositions related to intergovernmental equalization grants are always implicitly or 
explicitly derived from one model of government or another. The paper assumes that 
governments are competitive organisms. In such a frame of reference, equalization payments 
serve to insure that all the units in a decentralized governmental system have a chance to 
share in the benefits of competition. In other words, equalization payments are stabilization 
instruments. As such they will generally have an effect on the interpersonal distribution of 
income, but they are not motivated by that effect. The paper also argues that economic 
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I. Introduction 
 
What purpose do intergovernmental equalization grants serve? The literature on their 
efficiency is large, but far from consistent in the matter of what they are and what they (should?) 
do. In the pages that follow, we suggest an approach to these payments that has something to say on 
whether they improve or worsen the overall allocation of resources while departing from more 
standard or conventional approaches. In the last analysis, the view one adopts vis-à-vis equalization 
grants - vis-à-vis what they are (or should be?) designed to achieve - is very much determined by 
the model, explicit or implicit, of government one embraces and by one's priors concerning the 
nature of federalism. 
In what follows, we begin by suggesting a particular model of government −  one which, we 
believe, accounts for the historical and current observable patterns of production and supply of 
goods and services (including redistribution and regulation) by modern democratic governments. 
Later, we make clear what are our priors concerning the nature of decentralization and federalism. 
The views of economists regarding the efficiency of governmental production and supply of 
goods and services range over the entire panorama of possibilities. This dispersion of views is, once 
more, a consequence of the priors held regarding the nature of democratic governments. We will 
suggest a hypothesis about efficiency that is consistent with the model of government we will be 
outlining. Following this, and before examining some consequences of what could be called a 
mispecification of terms regarding equalization payments, we consider by way of a comparative 
exercise the effects of economic globalization on the efficiency of governments and of 
intergovernmental transfers. 
In the next section, therefore, we propose a model of government, followed in Section III by a 
discussion of efficiency in governments and in the economy at large. Then, in Section IV, we 
suggest a role for intergovernmental transfers. Section V is devoted to economic globalization and 
its effects on public sector efficiency. In Section VI, we look at how equalization can be "faultily" 
designed and at some of the consequences of these failures. Section VII concludes the paper. 
 
II. Modelling Governments 
There are many theories of government even if we restrict ourselves to the economic literature 
broadly defined. In Competitive Governments (1996), Breton attempted a classification and a brief 
summary followed by a critique of many of these theories. All of them are still in circulation. It   4
would serve no purpose to review those models and their use. Instead, we will briefly outline the 
approach to government Breton proposed and defended in his 1996 monograph. 
The evidence, we suggest, is consistent with the hypothesis that modern democratic 
governments are compound structures made up of a large number of autonomous or semi-
autonomous elected and non-elected centres of power. We can go beyond this observation to the 
view that the evidence is consistent with the proposition that even if the production of goods and 
services by public sector bodies requires and involves coordination among centres of power, these 
centres compete with each other. Before defending that view, we acknowledge that there are from 
time to time attempts at collusion between centres of power that are sometimes successful. Still, not 
anymore than in the marketplace, do successful collusions in particular instances point to the 
absence of competition generally. 
It is best to conceive of competition among centres of power the way Joseph Schumpeter 
(1911; 1942) understood competition in the market economy: a process of creative destruction in 
which new processes, products, sources of supply, etc. replace old ones. We know from the work of 
Paul Samuelson (1943; 1982) that neo-classical economic price-quantity adjustments play a 
background role in Schumpeterian competition, even though the observed process and its 
manifestations as described by Schumpeter pay little attention to these underlying background 
forces. It is relatively easy to relate the fundamental mechanisms of Schumpeterian competition to 
those underlying the working of check and balances between centres of power in politics −  a notion 
that has been around, both as normative injunction and as positive reference point for over 2000 
years (see Panagopoulos, 1985). Indeed, the way Schumpeterian competition and checks and 
balances work are remarkably similar (see Breton, 1996, Chapter 3). 
But there is more to competition in politics than intra-governmental competition −  competition 
between centres of power in compound governments. There is growing acceptance of the idea that 
governments in a given society compete with each other. The mechanism that motivates that 
manifestation of competition, which years ago Breton (1987) labeled the Salmon mechanism,
1 is 
different from that underlying checks and balances, but is a competitive mechanism nonetheless. It 
is an application of the theory of labour tournaments introduced in economics by Edward Lazear 
and Sherwin Rosen (1981). Pierre Salmon (1987a; 1987b) was able to show that governing and 
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opposition parties are led to compete with each other when citizens can compare the performance 
of their government with that of governments in other jurisdiction. That in itself will lead to 
intergovernmental competition. Moreover, the Salmon mechanism, initially crafted to explain 
horizontal competition - competition among governments inhabiting a given jurisdictional level - 
can be applied, with one important modification (see below), to vertical competition - competition 
among governments located at different tiers (see Breton and Fraschini, 2003). 
The initial formulation of the Salmon mechanism assumed that citizens compared the 
performance of their own government to that of a benchmark government in terms of the "levels 
and qualities of services, of levels of taxes or of more general economic and social indicators" 
(Salmon, 1987b, 32). However, as argued by Breton (1996), competition in governmental systems 
compels all centers of power to forge wicksellian connections (defined in the next two paragraphs) 
so as to be granted the consent (vote) of citizens.
2 In the light of this result, we suggest that citizens 
evaluate the relative performance of governments in terms of the tightness of wicksellian 
connections – both for horizontal and vertical competition. In other words, if there are n centers of 
power indexed i and if we let wi (i = 1, … ,n) be a measure of the tightness of the wicksellian 
connection generated by center of power i, with wi normalized so that 0 ≤  wi ≤  1, citizens will rank 
the centers of power that make up compound governments in terms of wi. 
What are wicksellian connections and why is it an improvement to articulate the Salmon 
mechanism on them rather than on the vector of goods, services, taxes, and other indicators on 
which the mechanism has hitherto been expressed? A wicksellian connection is a link between the 
quantity of a particular good or service supplied by centers of power and the taxprice that citizens 
pay for that good or service. Knut Wicksell (1896) and Erik Lindahl (1919) showed that if 
decisions regarding public expenditures and their financing were taken simultaneously and under a 
rule of (quasi) unanimity, a perfectly tight nexus between the two variables would emerge. Breton 
(1996) argued that competition between centers of power, if it was perfect and not distorted by 
informational problems, would also generate completely tight wicksellian connections. In the real 
world, competition is, of course, never perfect and informational problems abound and, as a 
consequence, wicksellian connections are less than perfectly tight. Still, as long as some 
competition exists, there will be wicksellian connections. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
1 Salmon's first paper on the subject was published in 1987, but was delivered at a seminar on federalism in 1984.   6
The virtue of a Salmon mechanism expressed in terms of wicksellian connections is that a 
given citizen can carry out comparisons of performance in terms of a common standardized 
variable, whether the benchmark government inhabits the same or a different jurisdictional level 
from that in which the citizen dwells. A variable that serves that purpose well is the size of the 
utility losses inflicted on citizens whenever the volume of goods and services provided by centers 
of power differs from the volume desired at given taxprices. Put differently, citizens experience the 
same kind of utility losses from decisions made by governments whatever the jurisdictional tier the 
governments inhabit. The goods and services supplied can differ, but the efforts to achieve 
tightness in wicksellian connections will not.
3 Indeed, the ability to compare performance 
horizontally is likely to reinforce the ability to execute vertical comparisons and vice versa. 
There is still resistance to the idea of intragovernmental and intergovernmental competition. 
But this resistance sometimes turns to hostility when students of public sector adjustments are 
confronted with the notion that governments compete with families, churches, charitable 
organizations, cooperatives, and other bodies which supply goods and services that are close 
substitutes for some of the goods and services supplied by governments. Among these, the most 
obvious are day care, health and nursing, old age security, unemployment insurance, and a host of 
others. In addition, governments sometimes compete in markets in the provision of certain goods 
and services such as transportation, broadcasting, education, insurance, car production, oil 
exploration, and so on. The interdependence of the public and private sectors is all pervasive. 
 
III. Efficiency 
To simplify the presentation of what we wish to propose regarding efficiency, let us assume to 
begin that competition rules everywhere in the economy, including the public sector. Given the 
interdependence just noted, the resulting general equilibrium configuration of resource allocation is 
one which, if subjected to an exogenous shock, will register changes in both the private and public 
sectors, irrespective of the origin of the disturbance. For example, given the interconnectedness, an 
external disturbance in one or more markets may not require adjustments only in other markets, but 
in some parts of the public sector as well. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
2 For a defence of that assumption, see Breton (1996, 48-57). See also the literature on probabilistic voting in, for 
example, Calvert (1986).   7
The idea of some behavioral interaction between the public and private sectors has already 
been examined in, for example, the theory of "unbalanced growth" (Baumol, 1967) - a dynamic 
form of interaction. The interdependence we have in mind is more static in character: it is the 
interdependence we find in standard Walrasian general equilibrium theory. In that framework, 
efficiency in the (overall) allocation of resources is the product of competition which insures that 
resources are channeled toward the alternatives in which their yield is a maximum. When 
competition breaks down, either because of collusion or monopolization or when it is distorted by 
ad hoc interventions, efficiency in resource allocation is reduced. In the conventional approach to 
(static) efficiency, the prime ad hoc distortive interventions are taxes, subsidies, and other like 
policies. However, in a frame of reference in which governments are competitive, taxes and 
subsidies are in the nature of taxprices −  positive or negative −  paid per unit of good and/ or service 
provided. They are user fees, like the price paid for a newspaper. 
In  Competitive Governments (1996), Breton used Knut Wicksell's (1896) approach to the 
provision of goods and services by public bodies to argue that competition creates the conditions 
that lead to the satisfaction of the two conditions which he showed were necessary and sufficient to 
the formation of links between quantities demanded and their unit prices and thus to efficient 
supply. He labeled these links wicksellian connections. These, he noted, are not all or nothing 
relationships, but can be normalized to vary between zero and one. In other words, wicksellian 
connections can be loose or tight. 
The point is not that in the real world there are no significant departures from competitive 
allocations as a result of distortions (collusions, monopolizations, corruption, and a host of other 
factors) in the private and/or public sectors. There are. However, we are suggesting that we can 
better understand the meaning of these barriers to competition in a framework in which it is 
recognized that there is intragovernmental, intergovernmental, and extragovernmental competition 
and in which the allocation of resources is seen to take place in a general equilibrium framework in 
which the private and public sectors are organically interdependent. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
3 As in the tournament model suggested by Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), the comparison of performance will be more 
precise if the random disturbances affecting performance are common to all centres of power instead of being 
idiosyncratic to each.   8
IV. Understanding Intergovernmental Transfers 
We now come to intergovernmental transfers. We begin by arguing that their purpose cannot 
be to cause a change in the interpersonal distribution of income - that is, to deal with an equity 
problem. That done, we offer a rationale for these grants that is consistent with the hypothesis 
suggested in the foregoing paragraphs regarding the nature of government and of efficiency in a 
general (private markets and public bodies) equilibrium framework. 
There are many analytical traditions in the economic literature on intergovernmental grants. 
There is, for example, an interjurisdictional spillover tradition (Breton, 1965; Oates, 1972), an 
income redistribution tradition (Buchanan, 1952; Scott, 1952), a fiscal imbalance tradition 
(Musgrave, 1961), and an "inefficient" mobility of labour tradition (Flatters, Henderson and 
Mieszkowski, 1974; Boadway and Flatters, 1982). These are still not integrated and unified in any 
meaningful sense and, in all likelihood, cannot and never will be. The theoretical work in these 
various traditions has, however, one assumption in common: it treats provincial or state 
governments
4 −  the recipients of money from central governments −  as conduits for transfers to 
individuals and/or firms for the purpose of achieving pre-stated objectives (the sources of the 
various traditions just noted): internalization of spillovers, redistribution of net fiscal benefits, etc. 
Sometimes the provincial government-as-conduit assumption is camouflaged by a prior 
supposition that all citizens have identical preferences. But even in these cases, the province-as-
conduit assumption delivers its pay-load. To understand the meaning of the assumption, it suffices 
to recognize that all the objectives that are assigned to transfer programmes can be more efficiently 
achieved by an interpersonal than by an intergovernmental transfer system. Indeed, one can 
probably make the case that, as a matter of historical fact, to the extent that governments have been 
preoccupied with the objectives which grant theorists impute to them and to the extent that they 
have used grants to achieve these objectives, they have resorted to interpersonal grants, namely to 
grants made to persons (families) and/or firms, but sometimes "mediated" by, or effected through, 
more junior governments
5. In this connection, it is well to recall that in most societies income 
redistribution policy is embodied in a variety of 'welfare' programmes based on the age, the 
employment situation, the family status, the health conditions and on other characteristics of the 
                                                 
4 Henceforth we use the words province and provincial for cantonal, regional, state, and other like governments. 
5 For example, to make effective the right of all youth to benefit from primary and secondary education, the Italian 
central government transfers funds to the regions that, in turn, hands the funds over to the municipalities. These then 
proceed to award grants to families in support of scholastic expenditures.   9
individuals, families and groups that are recipients. Proposals to 'streamline' these programmes 
have often been made by academics, royal commissioners, and others on the basis of little-known 
research which shows, one presumes, that existing programmes are inefficient. George Akerlof 
(1978) has shown, however, that a strong case can be made that the patchwork of programmes that 
form the income redistribution policy of societies is more efficient than some proposed 
'streamlined' systems would be, because for any given volume of redistribution the excess-burden 
of the revenues needed to pay for it is smaller in the patchwork than in the streamlined system. 
What Akerlof calls "tagging", namely the use of certain characteristics to identify the individuals 
and groups in need, is simply a device that insures that resources are not transferred to those who 
are not in need. 
On the basis of the foregoing, one would have to conclude that from an income redistribution 
point of view, intergovernmental transfers are inefficient because the governments of some 
jurisdictions in which rich and poor citizens reside receive funds, whereas the governments of other 
jurisdictions in which rich and poor citizens also reside do not receive any funds as a result of the 
fact that average per capita income (say) is lower in the first than in the second jurisdiction. 
Intergovernmental transfers, in other words, are inconsistent with "tagging" and, therefore, with 
efficient redistribution. 
If interpersonal are more efficient than intergovernmental grants, why do central governments 
sometimes use the second type of grants
6? Is it that central governments are not pursuing, through 
these grants, the objectives that analysts think they ought to be pursuing? Is it possible, in other 
words, that the objectives which central governments are pursuing require intergovernmental grants 
programmes in addition to the interpersonal grants programmes they are implementing? Our 
answer to this query is in the affirmative. Intergovernmental grants are needed to stabilize the 
outcomes of competition among provincial governments and, by achieving that objective, make 
competition more effective and more efficient. This does not mean that these transfers do not have 
effects on income distribution, on mobility, on the expenditure patterns of recipient governments, 
and on other variables, but it means that grants programmes should be analyzed and evaluated in 
terms of their contribution to the stability of horizontal intergovernmental competitive outcomes, 
not on some other basis.   10
How do intergovernmental grants contribute to competitive stability? Simply by equalizing the 
capacity of provincial governments to compete with each other, that is, by insuring that some 
(poor) provincial governments are not permanent losers in the competitive struggle that 
characterizes their relationship with other provincial governments. If the grants were interpersonal 
instead of intergovernmental, the relative positions of provincial governments would be unchanged 
by grants, even if that of their constituents was, unless of course the provincial tax rates were such 
as to fully recapture, province by province, the sums granted by central governments. If it is 
recalled that the jurisdictions in which governments are recipients of grants are made up, like those 
from which the funds are derived, of rich and poor persons, a tax recapture scheme would, of 
necessity, be quite complicated and not obviously constitutional in democratic states. 
To have a more equal capacity to compete is not the same thing as providing the citizens of 
every province with the same bundle of governmentally supplied goods and services: the same 
schooling facilities and programmes, the same health services, the same number and quality of 
public libraries, the same number of hectares of public parks, and so on. That would amount to a 
denial of the very nature of decentralization and federalism. For a government to possess a more 
equal capacity to compete means that it is in a position to provide a volume and quality of goods 
and services that yield to its citizens a level of utility reasonably comparable to those provided in 
other jurisdictions without having to resort to unduly burdensome levels of taxation again relative 
to the levels collected elsewhere. 
We note at this point that citizens have a demand for tighter wicksellian connections because 
the tighter the connection, the smaller the volume of utility loss they have to bear. However, as we 
have seen, tightness of wicksellian connection is a (positive) function of the effectiveness of 
intergovernmental competition. If that effectiveness is increased by intergovernmental equalization 
transfers, we must assume that citizens have a derived demand for efficient competition-inducing 
equalization payments. These transfers, like intergovernmental grants, are arguments in their utility 
functions. Taxprices collected to pay for them create utility losses only to the extent that the 
taxprices exceed or fall short of the marginal value citizens place on these transfers.  
That view of equalization payments can be profitably contrasted to that of the school of 
thought that can be called the Queen's University (Kingston, Ontario) conception of federalism (see 
                                                                                                                                                                   
6 In principle, central governments can implement a transfer programme by payments made out of a general revenue 
account or they could levy revenues from wealthier provinces and make payments to poorer ones as if  out of an   11
Flatters, Henderson, and Mieszkowski, 1974; Boadway and Flatters, 1982). In that view, if the 
province of Alberta (say) benefits from large oil royalties following a rise in the price of crude, it is 
the duty of Ottawa to tax these provincial revenues to prevent "inefficient" in-migration of labour 
into Alberta. If that argument is granted, it would seem reasonable to argue that Ottawa should 
grant resources to the provincial government of Quebec (or to any other province) to prevent 
"inefficient" out-migration from the province if some Quebeckers adopt a destructive separatist 
agenda. We are led to ask: is it the central government's function in a true federation to incessantly 
undo what is done at the periphery? It is hardly surprising that those who have adhered to the 
Queen's model have come to think of federalism as second (or worse) best compared to a strictly 
unitary and fully centralized state. 
In  Competitive Governments (1996), Breton examined a variety of empirical economic, 
sociological, and political science literatures which tell stories that he interpreted as manifestations 
or indications of the workings of intergovernmental competition. One of these stories describes the 
rate of diffusion of policies over provinces after an initial introduction by one provincial 
government. To visualize how an intergovernmental grants programme can help stabilize 
competition, consider how it would affect the operation of that diffusion process. Assume, 
therefore, that a province innovates by introducing a new policy that receives support not only in 
the province in which it is implemented, and henceforth serves as a Salmon benchmark. The 
expected response within the competitive paradigm is for other provinces to follow. But what if one 
or more other provinces cannot follow because they lack the necessary resources to do so? 
Presumably, labour, capital and/or technology will leave these jurisdictions, worsening their 
position relative to the pre-innovation one, while improving that of the host provinces. That 
describes instability and it is apparent that an intergovernmental grants programme can prevent this 
from happening. 
In concluding this section, we insist that these grants must be unconditional. To see this it 
suffices to note that if they were conditional and if the conditions were set by central governments, 
as they would have to be, the grants programmes would simply suppress competition. Central 
governments may want to do this in certain circumstances or in respect of specific policy areas, but 
if they did this on a broad front, it would simply extinguish the decentralized and/or federal 
                                                                                                                                                                   
earmarked account. As we will see, the distinction though empirically interesting, is theoretically not meaningful.   12
character of the governmental system itself. Conditional grants can be seen as equivalent to a 
centralization of constitutional powers. 
 
V. Globalization 
We now engage in a simple comparative static exercise. For that purpose, we focus on 
economic globalization
7 and assume that this phenomenon is a consequence of the operation of the 
following three factors: 1) the virtual elimination of all restrictions on the free movement of capital 
made possible by the removal of quantitative and non-quantitative barriers to trade; 2) the 
increasing harmonization and standardization of the rules that govern trade, investment, 
employment, property rights, environmental policies, and so on; and 3) as a consequence of (2), 
that is, as a consequence of the adoption of common standardized rules regarding investments – 
rules that necessarily tend to reflect the practices prevailing in the dominant economies of the world 
where at present more or less all assets are traded or tradable – the elimination of impediments to 
the private ownership of all assets. 
Globalization is still only incipient. It is, however, sufficiently present to produce observable 
results. In respect of governments and governmental systems, globalization's main consequence is 
to undermine wicksellian connections. It does this in the following way. The capital of large 
corporations being increasingly mobile as trade in goods and services becomes freer, corporations 
can threaten to leave a jurisdiction unless the government of that jurisdiction provides the public 
services they demand. Corporate enterprises make similar threats to put downward pressure on the 
tax rates that apply to the income they earn. That by itself undermines wicksellian connections. But 
that is only the first step. The necessity to provide goods and services to corporations at taxprices 
that are not high enough to cover the jurisdiction's unit costs of production and delivery implies that 
goods and services will be provided to the citizenry in general at taxprices that are higher than unit 
costs. That finishes the job of undermining wicksellian connections. 
The foregoing can be given a more analytical twist. An increase in the degree of economic 
globalization increases the market power of business corporations because globalization increases 
the mobility of capital. As a result, a government that chooses to attract capital or decides to hold 
                                                 
7 The word globalization should not be used without an epithet. Economic globalization, cultural globalization, 
technological globalization, human rights globalization, etc., though sometimes closely related are different from each 
other. Indeed, as recent history has documented, some countries support (indeed promote) economic globalization   13
onto capital already in its jurisdiction will accept to provide goods and services demanded by 
corporate interests at lower taxprices and/or in greater quantity or quality than it would if capital 
was less mobile. The greater mobility of capital, in other words, will have made corporations into 
more effective oligopsonists in their purchases of governmentally supplied goods and services and, 
as a consequence, will benefit from larger oligopsonistic rents – rents that will inflict a deadweight 
cost on society. The "transfer" to oligopsonists means that citizens would have to pay more for the 
goods and services provided them, assuming, as we must, no change in the government's budget 
constraint. The quantity of publicly supplied goods and services demanded by citizens will 
therefore decline. Citizens will search for alternative suppliers
8. The proposition that globalization 
undermines wicksellian connections therefore means that in the new equilibrium, corporate 
interests benefit from larger oligopsonistic rents while the citizenry at large demands fewer 
governmentally provided goods and services. The increment in globalization will then have been 
accompanied by a transfer of supply from public to private institutions.
9 In the process, 
globalization changes the distribution of political power in society in favour of corporate capital 
against the institutions that have responsibility for the general welfare of the citizenry. The special 
treatment of some groups in society – in this case corporate interests – that has been ascribed to 
capture or to rent-seeking, we impute to globalization. 
To repeat. The forces that generate economic globalization are forces that lead to increased 
competition in private markets. The burden of the foregoing discussion is that the same forces 
decrease intergovernmental competition and, thus, reduce the tightness of wicksellian connections. 
A manifestation of this are the appearance of new or increased oligopsonistic rents to corporate 
enterprises. 
However, globalization does not undermine wicksellian connections equally across all 
jurisdictions of governmental systems. It is reasonable to suppose that junior governments, whose 
inability to compete in a non-globalized (or in a less globalized) world was already a fact, would be 
                                                                                                                                                                   
while seeking, at the same time, to curtail human rights globalization. We are concerned with economic globalization 
only. 
8 In the short-term alternative suppliers may not even exist. However, it must be assumed that in the longer-run, supply 
will respond to demand. In any case, if the services supplied cannot be “privatized” – street lighting or street cleaning 
may be examples – we then expect the quality or the quantity supplied will be reduced. 
9 Some countries are less affected by globalization. This will be the case if, for example, a large fraction of corporate 
interests are family owned and controlled. That ownership pattern will act as an impediment to the in- and out-flows of 
capital.   14
particularly hard hit by economic globalization. If that is the case, the need for intergovernmental 
transfers would be greater following an increase in globalization. 
The external disturbance that takes the form of an increase in economic globalization allows us 
to be more precise about the costs and benefits involved. The increment in intergovernmental 
grants that will make it possible for a "weak" government to compete with the other governments 
of a given polity will do so by, let us say, attracting capital, whether physical or human, that would 
otherwise have gone elsewhere. The intergovernmental grant, in other words, re-allocates capital 
from a higher to a lower yield opportunity. The difference between the two yields multiplied by the 
volume of displaced capital is a measure of the total cost of the intergovernmental transfer and a 
measure of the loss in economic efficiency in that economy. It is a trivial exercise, from there, to 
calculate the cost of any increment in economic globalization. 
It is very important, however, not to bring the analysis to a close at this particular point. The 
intergovernmental grant also increases the capacity of the "weak" recipient government to compete 
and as such allows a closer link between taxprices and the goods and services supplied by that 
government to its citizens. It makes for tighter wicksellian connections. As we have argued, the 
tighter the wicksellian connections the smaller the utility losses suffered by citizens. In other words, 
intergovernmental transfers, by allowing for tighter wicksellian connections, improve the allocation 
of resources on the consumption side of the ledger and thus increase efficiency from that point of 
view. 
The reduction in utility losses −  the gain in consumer welfare −  consequent on the transfers 
must be matched against the cost in terms of distortions in the capital market defined to include 
human as well as non-human capital. The optimal size of intergovernmental grants is one that 
equates the two margins. 
 
VI. Deviations 
It is possible (easy?) to design intergovernmental equalization programmes in such a way that 
the marginal gains in utility from tighter wicksellian connections fall short of the marginal costs of 
distortions in the capital market. That is especially likely to be the case if equalization payments are 
rationalized as redistributive grants by those who design them. The tendency in that case is to 
configure the transfer system in such a way that the outcome is one that "harmonizes" the 
relationship between the governments of a polity by making them all essentially alike. That sort of   15
harmonization reduces and ultimately suppresses intergovernmental competition and, in this way, 
makes utility gains from grants equal to zero, while leaving the cost side unaffected. 
The evidence seems to indicate that both Australia and Germany have designed 
intergovernmental grants systems that equalize to such a degree the position of all governments in 
the federations that interstate and interläender competition has been, in fact, greatly reduced, 
possibly extinguished.
10 The situation in these two federations raises a problem on which the 
foregoing has been silent. We have indeed been concerned only with the size of intergovernmental 
transfers without paying any attention to the arrangements from which they flow. 
This problem is important because the arrangement −  the formulae that select what counts and 
what does not count in setting the size of the grants −  is crucial in determining their effectiveness as 
stabilizing agents. If we accept the view that intergovernmental grants, though they have 
redistributional consequences like any other economic activity, should not be designed as 
redistributive, but as stabilizing, then the "needs" side −  what citizens in a jurisdiction 'need' by way 
of public services −  should not enter the calculus that determines their size. Fiscal capacity and 
fiscal effort relative to some benchmark −  relative to the average of x "representative" provinces 
(say) −  are the only relevant variables.
11 To put it differently, the transfers should be such that the 
government of each province is in a position to provide (is capable of providing) its citizens with a 
reasonably comparable level of basic services (as the benchmark) without having to resort to 
unduly burdensome levels of taxation. We suggest that as long as the definition of "basic services" 
is not too restrictive −  it allows, for example, for the provision of training programmes that lead to 
high-quality jobs or to the possibility of concert halls if that is the way the government wants to 
compete with other neighbourhood governments −  a formula based on these principles would 





                                                 
10 In a recent communication, Paul Bernd Spahn of Goethe Universität was unsure as to whether interläender 
competition in Germany had been only reduced or completely extinguished. 
11 In this connection, we note that the recent change to the Article 119 of the Italian Constitution (Constitutional Law n. 
3/2001 that modifies Title V, Second Part, of the Constitution), mandating that equalization be based on per capita 
fiscal capacity alone and no longer on "needs", is a significant improvement.   16
VII. Conclusion 
We have argued that intergovernmental transfers, in a framework in which governments are 
assumed to be competitive, should be conceived as stabilizing and competition-inducing payments, 
not as redistributive grants. Their function is to insure that all units in a federation −  indeed, in any 
decentralized governmental system −  are able to hold their own in the competitive struggle among 
units of government. Competition is not, however, pursued as an end in itself −  a sort of panacea. 
Indeed, the virtue of competition is that it forges links between the taxprices paid by citizens and 
the units of goods and services they demand. The stronger the degree of competition, the tighter the 
links and the smaller the losses in utility suffered by citizens from the public provision of goods 
and services. 
We have also argued that economic globalization operates to reduce the tightness of 
wicksellian connections in “weaker” provinces and, as such, increases the need for 
intergovernmental equalization payments if the effectiveness of competition is to be maintained.   17
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